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FAL WELL V. FL YNT: LAMPOONING OR LIABLITY;
THE REALIZATION OF A THREE-PRONGED TORT
APPROACH FOR ESTABLISHING MEDIA LIABILITY FOR
FICTIONAL DEFAMATION
Historically, in most states, the law of defamation protected an
individual's right to personal security which included the individual's entitle-
ment to enjoyment of his reputation.' Prior to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, I an action for defamation was
governed by state common law without any First Amendment protections.'
Since this decision, courts have subjected the law of defamation to a plethora
of legal tests which attempt to balance an individual's right to a good reputa-
tion against the media's constitutional freedoms of speech and press.' One
observer (Wade) of this tort-law evolution foresaw the possibility that defama-
tion actions might eventually be based upon one if not all of the following tort
theories of liability: Invasion of Privacy; Libel; Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress.' Each theory of liability has developed separately and until this
time with little practicality of convergence.' Wade further predicted that the
latter tort (which itself was rapidly developing) would eventually circumvent
and supplant the former dignitary torts and provide "a single integrated system
of protecting plaintiffs peace of mind against acts of the defendant. ..."'
However, it was Mead who assembled statistical data that revealed the trend
during the late 1970's toward multiple pleadings of these independent torts in
defamation actions Mead predicted that if this trend continued, it would
create confusion among the courts and disrupt their carefully delineated deci-
'Fuller v. Edwards, 180 Va. 191, 197, 22 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1942).
2376 U.S. 254, motion denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964).
'Note, Toward a New Standard of Liability for Defamation in Fiction, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1115 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, New Standard]. The previous standard was one of strict liability. Maynard v. Port
Publications, 98 Wis. 2d 555, 564-65, 297 N.W.2d 500, 505-06 (1980).
'Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press - An Extended Comment on
'The Anderson Solution, " 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 815 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstynel. See
Spahn, Libel and Slander, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 769 (1983); Clarke, Freedom of Speech And The Problem of
The Harmful Public Reaction: Adult Use Cases of Renton And Mini Theatres, 20 AKRON L. REV. 187, 200
(1986) [hereinafter cited as Clarke, Freedom of Speech]. The First Amendment guards against unreasonable
self-censorship. Id.
'Mead, Suing Media For Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23
WASHBURN L.J. 24 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mead], (citing Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy,
15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wade]).
'Mead, supra note 5, at 25-26. See also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).
'Mead, supra note 5, at 24. Note his discussion that multiple pleadings may allow plaintiffs to avoid pre-trial
losses or summary judgment rulings.
'Mead, supra note 5, at 29-37, referring to Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd in part
and rev d in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, cert. denied 449 U.S.
899 (1980).
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sions as to liability under each separate tort.'
Mead's prediction appears to be well-founded given the 1986 decision in
Falwell v. Flynt. 1o Falwell is an important decision because it is one of the first
cases under this multiple pleading format to allow a public figure plaintiff to
recover damages for defamation-type injuries without proving libel on a fic-
tional publication. 1
This article will discuss the appellate court's interpretation and applica-
tion of the three tort theories of liability. It will also analyze the potential
floodgate effect this case may have on future defamation actions against the
media for publishing fictional publications, including political cartoons.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Reverend Jerry Falwell, is a well-known pastor and an in-
fluential commentator on political issues. 2 Falwell sued publishers Larry Flynt
and Hustler Magazine, Inc. in the United States District Court of the Western
District of Virginia because of an advertisement parody that was published in
the defendant's magazine. 3
The parody (cartoon) satired a Campari Liqueur advertisement, that
featured celebrities, by using a photograph of the plaintiff with accompanying
dialogue text attributed to him.' The text contained statements in which the
plaintiff allegedly detailed an incestuous relationship with his mother behind
an outhouse. 5 The text also included references about their immoral and
drunken dispositions. 6 The defendants' cartoon included a disclaimer at the
bottom of the cartoon which stated "Ad Parody - not to be taken seriously.""
Falwell sued on three separate counts of libel, invasion of privacy and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress." The trial court dismissed the inva-
sion of privacy claim but sent the remaining claims to the jury.'9 The jury
found for the defendants on the libel claim on the basis that no reasonable
9Mead, supra note 5, at 55.
'*Falwell v. Flynt, Nos. 85-1417(L), 85-1480 W.D.Va. (1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'gen
banc denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986). The trial court's opinion is unreported.
"Skin Mag Loses, 72 A.B.A.J. 80 (November 1, 1986) [hereinafter cited as ABA Journal].
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1272. (The parties agreed that Falwell was public figure).
"Id. at 1270. Flynt Distributing Company was a co-defendant in the district court suit only. Note that the
parody was published in November 1983 and in March 1984. Id. at 1272.
"Id. at 1272. The real Campari ads contained pictures and interviews with celebrities in which they detailed
the "first time" they drank Campari. The parody played on this first time theme to mean sex. Id.
15ld.
Id.
17Id.
"Id.
"Id. at 1273.
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reader would believe that the parody described actual facts about Falwell."
The jury found the defendants liable on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim and awarded $200,000 in damages.2' The defendants appealed
and the plaintiff cross-appealed the verdicts." The United States Court of Ap-
peals (Fourth Circuit) affirmed the District Court's decision." Despite a strong
dissent, the majority of the appellate court denied the defendants' petition for a
rehearing en banc.2'
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
In deciding the Falwell appeal, the Court considered the availability and
requirements involved in applying all three theories of liability in light of the
State of Virginia's common law and general constitutional principles."
The Court stated that although at one time a plaintiffs sole remedy for
defamatory publications rested in proving libel, it recognized the trend toward
allowing multiple tort claims for allegedly defamatory statements.26 The Court
admitted that when the plaintiff is a public official," public figure2 or claims
invasion of privacy29 a media defendant is entitled to the same First Amend-
ment protection." In a defamation suit, this protection requires such plaintiffs
'OId. This test can negate a defamation claim. See James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834,
386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976). See generally Note, New Standard, supra note 3, for a discussion of fictional libel
and the rationale for treating such libel differently from false statements of fact.
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273. The jury awarded $100,000 in actual damages, $50,000 in punitive damages
against both Flynt and Hustler and nothing against Flynt Distributing Company. Id. Notice the deposition
of Flynt where he testified about his intent to assassinate Falwell's character. Id.
"Id at 1272. The court classified the issues on appeal into four groups: constitutional (defamation); common
law tort regarding emotional distress; evidentiary; and the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim. Id.
Discussion of the evidentiary claim is beyond the scope of this article.
23Id.
"Falwell, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986). Justice Wilkinson's dissenting opinion raises serious questions about
the appellate court's decision.
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274.
"Id., (referring to Mead, supra note 5 at 24). Also see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). Here,
the court discussed fault levels and the historical application of strict liability on the media for false publica-
tion.
11d. (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. 254). Generally the category of public officials includes those people
who are classified as public officers including those public employees who exercise substantial governmental
power. Id.
"Id (citing Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)). For the most part those who attain
this status (of public figure) have assumed roles of special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classified as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment. See generally, Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public Interest - The Libel Law Conundrum, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (1984).
"Falwell. 797 F.2d at 1274 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)). Invasion of privacy is generally
described as the unconsented, unprivileged and unreasonable intrusion into the private life of an individual.
See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274. This protection is not available where the plaintiff is a private figure. The ra-
tionale behind this requirement is that a private figure is unable to find adequate means to publicly rebut
allegedly defamatory statements. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Summer, 19871 NOTES
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to prove that the defendant published the statement with a high level of fault
consistent with "actual malice."'" The court emphasized that this intentional
or reckless level of fault is comparable between actions lying either in libel or
intentional infliction of emotional distress and therefore satisfies the First
Amendment standards for protecting the press against unreasonable self-
censorship. 2 Upon making this determination, the Court reasoned that under
Virginia law33 there was little problem in allowing an alternative claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress3" notwithstanding Falwell's failure to
prove libel due to the use of the reasonableness test.35
The court stated that Flynt's testimony revealed his intent to emotionally
disturb Falwell.36 Additionally, the Court found that the language contained in
the parody, in combination with its republication sufficiently proved the
outrageousness of the defendants' conduct.37 The Court gave considerable
weight to Falwell's testimony regarding his mental anguish after the parody's
publication to establish the severity of his distress."
The Court decided that the evidence presented39 was sufficient to uphold
the jury verdict of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Virginia law?'
3Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274 (citing New York Times rule that a public official plaintiff in a defamation action
must prove actual malice). This means that the publication was made with the defendant's "knowledge that
it was false or with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
This was extended to public figures in Curtis, 388 U.S. 130. The purpose of this fault standard is to "assure
(the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269, (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). See, e.g.,
Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E. 2d 132 (1976). Virginia requires this standard.
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275.
11Id. at 1276, (citing Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cit. 1985)). The court apparently found that the trial
court did not err as to the libel issue and assumed that the emotional distress issue required its full attention
on appeal.
1'Id., cf. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3rd Cir. 1979). The Chuy court allowed
a semi-public figure to recover for mental anguish despite his failure to prove libel. Id. at 1276. But see,
Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978), which arguably disputes
this practice, at least in New York.
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276. The Court summarily dismissed the defendants' contention that the parody was
an opinion and therefore privileged. This decision appears contrary to a body of defamation decisions deal-
ing with fiction or political cartoons. See Miller v. Charleston Gazette, No. 84-C-428R (W. Va. C.C. 1983) 9
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2540 (a public official was denied recovery due to an outrageous cartoon which con-
tained sexual connotations); Hanson v. Feuling, 160 Wis. 511, 152 N.W. 287 (1915); Myers v. Boston
Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 907, 403 N.E.2d 380 (1980); Naughton and Gilbertson, Libelous Ridicule by Jour-
nalists, 18 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 450 (1969).
"Falwell. 797 F.2d at 1276.
37Id.
3Sld.
31d. at 1276-77 (the court found that evidence of Falwell's suffering appeared through Flynt's deposition,
Falwell's testimony and that of a colleague, language in the parody and its republication). It appears that thejury presumed the severity of Falwell's emotional distress. The resulting symptoms do not appear to be more
than a reasonable man could endure. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). See Harris v. Jones,
281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977) for an illustration of outrageousness and severity.
"Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276-77 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1974)). In
Virginia an action for emotional distress will lie where the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless;
[Vol. 2 1:1
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The Court also reviewed the Virginia invasion of privacy statute4' and
reasoned that the defendants' use of Falwell's photograph did not violate the
statute because such use would not allow a reader to reasonably believe the
false statement.42
ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals decision raises serious practical and theoretical im-
plications by affording a public figure43 redress for emotional injuries in an area
traditionally covered by libel law." Allowing the substitution of an emotional
distress claim for libel in a defamation action for a fictional publication may
create a chilling effect on the intercourse of vigorous public debate and unduly
penalize the media. 45 The Falwell decision in effect allows a public figure plain-
tiff to recover damages for injuries that were traditionally available only after
proof of libel.41 This decision creates a dilemma for the media when it equates
outrageousness with publication of a fictional work.4 ' The purpose of political
satire and parody is to cause the subject some degree of distress.48 Certainly in
cases like this, "a certain toughness of the mental hide (would be) a better pro-
tection than the law could ever be. '49 The trial court jury obviously believed
offends set standards of decency and morality; a causal connection between the conduct and the plaintiffs
emotional distress, which distress was severe. Id. at 1275, note 4.
'VA. CODE § 8.01-40 (1985). The pertinent text reads as follows:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having first obtained the written consent
of such person, or if dead, of the surviving consort and if none, of the next of kin, or if a minor, the
written consent of his or her parent or guardian, for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade,
such persons may maintain a suit in equity against the person, firm, or corporation so using such per-
son's name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use. And if the defendant shall have knowingly
used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful
by this chapter, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
This statute is primarily concerned with restricting the use of a person's name or picture for use in trade.
"
2Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1278. The Court found no Virginia decisions which construed this statute and opted
to review New York State's similar "privacy" statute and cases which construe the statute. Id. The Court's
discussion of the reasonable reader test refers to Hicks v. Casablanca, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (Wilkinson, C.J. dissenting). The chief justice strongly argued that Falwell
is more than a public figure and is actually closer to the public official status due to his extensive involve-
ment in political affairs.
"Id. at 485 (provides a good analysis of the implications in light of current law). See Wilson, The Law of
Libel and the Art of Fiction, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.;Nos. 4, 27, 28 and 46-49 (1981).
"sFalwell, 805 F.2d at 484-85 (citing Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 133-34). Also see Yorty v. Chandler, 13 Cal.
App. 3d. 467,476, 91 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1985); and Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10
(1970).
'Falwell, 805 F.2d at 484-85 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) and Gertz, 418
U.S. at 350). Damages for mental suffering are available after proving libel. The effect of meaning reputa-
tional and mental damages is exemplified in McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 390 So. 2d 556,
568-69 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
17Falwell, 805 F.2d at 487.
"Id. While political humor is often in bad taste (both appellate courts felt this parody was extremely base)
the courts have generally protected even the most repulsive of speech. See Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 284 (1974); Miller, supra note 35, at 2546.
"Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
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this when they found the defendants not liable for libel.
When a public person is involved, that person has adequate means in
which to counteract the adverse effects of the publication. 0 The situation is
different when a "private" person is involved and the courts consistently have
recognized a greater need to protect these persons from all harm.5
The Falwell decision appears to have no limiting effects on defamation
lawsuits against the media. 2 It seemingly allows a public official or a public
figure to recover for: mental anguish from a true but outrageous statement,53
or any statement which intends to inflict harm,54 while basing liability on a
presumption of severe emotional injuries.55
Other jurisdictions including California, New York and Oregon, have ex-
plicitly refused to allow recovery on these alternative tort theories when a
public figure plaintiff has failed to prove libel for defamatory statements.56 In
fact, a United States District Court in Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., re-
viewed the Falwell opinions before deciding that this alternative pleading for-
mat was intellectually incorrect. 7 The plaintiff in Ault, sued for libel, invasion
of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and other similar
theories of liability.58 The plaintiff was unable to prove that the defendant's
publication of an embarrassing photograph accompanied with an article that
portrayed her mental deficiencies constituted libel.59 The court concluded, that
allowing the plaintiff to restate the libel claim in terms of intentional infliction
of emotional distress would improperly allow her to avoid the stricter malice
standard required under the Constitution." The court stated:
"Falwell, 805 F.2d at 485, 487. The Court also commented on a related suit brought by the defendants in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which upheld Falwell's use of the cartoon in mass mailings to his
followers in an attempt to raise funds. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1986).
"See, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l., 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1101 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983); Arno v.
Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966); Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1980). In fact,
since the Gertz decision, most states have adopted a lesser standard of negligence to determine fault when a
private individual is allegedly defamed. II MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) § 1.17, 1-52, 1-53 (1982).
"Falwell, 805 F.2d at 488.
531d.
'4d., see supra note 45, which discusses the purpose (intent) of fictional or lampooning statements; Garrison,
supra note 26, at 73-74.
"Id. Also see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 327. Punitive damages for injuries were presumed. In many states as the
level of outrageousness increases there is a corresponding decrease in the severity requirement. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
mAult v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 86-381, (U.S.D.C. Ore. 1986), 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1660 (1986).
Here the court referred to Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal. App. 3d 677, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983); and Fischer v.
Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978). These courts refused to allow the
alternate claims.
"Ault, 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1662-63.
111d. at 1658. The court gave a detailed opinion as to each claim. Id.
"Id. at 1661.
1Id., at 1662.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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It is elementary that, although the gravamen of a defamation action is in-
jury to reputation, libel [sic] also visits upon a plaintiff humiliation, mor-
tification and emotional distress. In circumstances where a plaintiff states
a case of libel [sic], such personal distress is a matter which may be taken
into account in determining the amount of damages to which the plaintiff
is entitled, but it does not give rise to an independent cause of action on
the theory of a separate tort. To accede to the contentions of the plaintiff
in this case would be, in the words of Prosser, a step toward "swallowing
up and engulfing the whole law of defamation."6'
Another court described the social dilemma of allowing multiple pleadings
in that too broad of a scope of defamation "may curtail 'uninhibited, robust
and wide-open' discussion as much as may too low a standard of proof. ' 6 The
constitutional standards of proof, levels of fault, defenses and the similarity of
compensable injuries highlight the dangerous impracticality of substituting or
converging alternate tort claims in a defamation law suit. 3
Regarding damages, in a traditional defamation action, a plaintiff must
first prove reputational harm: any claim for mental anguish is considered
parasitic and only after the former is proven is the latter compensated." Men-
tal anguish is the heart of damages under intentional infliction of emotional
distress.65 Likewise, although the fundamental difference between invasion of
privacy and defamation claims is that the former concerns a person's own
peace of mind rather than one's reputation, damages regarding the former also
take into account mental suffering." An award of damages under invasion of
privacy can preclude recovery under libel as well due to the similarity of pro-
tected interests .6 The Falwell decision overlooks this reasoning and could very
well lead to the destruction of defamation law.
When the media is sued for publishing a fictional portrayal of persons, the
courts should limit the cause of action to one solely in defamation. This way,
the media can respect the historical limitations on their rights to free speech
and press when they choose to lampoon public figures. Additionally, it allows
the courts to award damages to persons injured by the media's publication of
untrue facts, rather than the coveted protected expressions of opinion. The use
of the reasonable reader test insures that the jury can make the distinction be-
1"Id. See Grimes v. Carter, 241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1966). The Grimes court reasoned that
the substitution of claims would render defendant's affirmative defenses (i.e. justified by truth) inoperable.
Id. at 702, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
'
2Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1980).
"Ault, 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1662.
"Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1244 (1982).
"Angelotta v. ABC, (D.C.N.D. Ohio, 1985), 12 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1491.
"Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1890). This article is considered as
the original framework for the invasion of privacy cause of action.
'Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 252 (1984).
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tween fact and opinion in deciding whether a person has been harmed. 8
CONCLUSION
This note has hopefully highlighted evidence that Wade and Mead cor-
rectly identified the trend toward plaintiffs creatively using the three-pronged
pleadings format to recover damages where none were available in libel6 9 The
similarity between privacy and libel actions is demonstrated by the use of the
reasonable reader test. No such test is used under an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. However, Justice Wilkinson's dissenting opinion in
Falwell revealed the danger such a trend poses to "society's interest in
uninhibited, robust and wide open debate" when applied to fictional publica-
tions about public officials or figures which "may include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks."7 This decision appears to under-
mine the First Amendment's7 purposes and disrupts the historical balance be-
tween an individual's right to a good reputation and the freedoms of speech
and press enjoyed by the media." One can easily imagine the chilling effect
(self-censorship) this decision will have on future publishers' and editors' at-
tempts to criticize, comment upon or lampoon public persons.
Additionally, the Falwell decision, which carries the threat of liability for
publishing non-libelous material, appears to be in conflict with two recently
decided Supreme Court rulings." These decisions appear to make it more dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to sue the media for defamation by requiring strict
adherence to high standards of proof of falsity or malice.74 Unfortunately,
before the Supreme Court is asked to address the issues raised in the Falwell
court's application of the multiple pleading format, the media is well advised to
beware of the risks of lampooning public persons.
CHRISTOPHER C. PATTERSON
68See generally, Franklin v. Friedman, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), 12 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1146.
"Mead, supra note 5, at 24.
7 Falwell, 805 F.2d at 488-89 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340).
"The First Amendment to the U.S. CONSTITUTION provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press;..." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"See generally Aistyne, supra note 4.
7"ABA Journal, supra note I1, at 81-82. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2508 (1986)
(the court held that a public figure must prove actual malice with convincing clarity); and Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). The Court held that a private individual must prove that
libelous statements were false. Id.
"ABA Journal, supra note 11, at 82. ee also, Falwell, 805 F.2d at 488.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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